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[Abstract] We examined the gender gap between wives and husbands with regard to time 
spent on unpaid housework and the interaction terms between the appearance of home 
appliances and gender among 36,480 Vietnamese households. We found the gender gap of 
time is persistent regardless of the number of coresiding children, age cohorts, household size 
and income, and working status of the couples. Wives spent 40.3–58.6 minutes more on 
unpaid housework daily. In household fixed-effect estimations, we found the interaction 
terms had a positive relationship with the time spent on unpaid housework. Where a gas 
cooker was available, the time spent on unpaid housework of the wife was 16.9 minutes more 
than that of her husband on a daily basis. However, we did not detect any significant 
interaction effects among pure dual-wage earners, and where husbands are aged less than 26 
years. 
 2 
1 Introduction 
“Stoves were labor-saving devices but the labor that they saved was male.” 
Cowan (1983, page 61) 
Our study examines whether the gender gap of time spent on unpaid housework exists and 
whether the appearance of home appliances reduces this gender gap between husbands and 
wives in Vietnam. We chose Vietnam because its transitioning economy contains both 
industrial and agricultural societies. Thanks to trade that is more open and to rising income 
levels, the lifestyle of Vietnamese households is improving
1
. In 2008, approximately 44.6%, 
11.9%, and 31.1% of households owned a gas cooker, washing machine, and fridge, 
respectively
2
. However, this implies that the majority of households lived without these 
appliances. There has also been a shift from agricultural to nonagricultural work. For example, 
55.1% of workers aged 15 years and over were employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishery 
in 2005, but this number had fallen to 52.3% in 2008
3
. Therefore, the allocation of time spent 
on work, unpaid housework, and leisure has changed. In addition, the total fertility rate fell 
from 2.25 to 2.08 children during 2001–20084. Thus, women had an increasing amount of 
time for paid work, leisure time, and unpaid housework over this period. 
The majority of the literature in this area analyzes the negative relationship between 
time on paid work and unpaid housework among working couples. Hersch and Stratton 
(1997), Kimmel and Connelly (2008) and Bloemen (2010) are examples of such studies. 
Hersch (2009) finds that men substitute less paid work for unpaid housework than women do. 
Gronau (1977) shows that an increase in the wife’s wage rate results in more paid working 
hours, less housework, and less leisure. Hersch and Stratton (1994) indicate that the gender 
gap on unpaid housework is due to the different wage rates of husbands and wives. Wales and 
Woodland (1997) further estimate the response of housework hours to the ratio of the wage 
rates. Gough (2011) finds unemployed individuals spend three to seven hours more per week 
on housework than when employed; and this increase is twice as large for women than for 
men. However, no study has investigated the case when both do not work, nor addressed the 
case where couples mix paid work with agricultural work and/or a home business. 
                                                 
1
 Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization in 2006 and experienced average annual GDP growth of over 
5% from 1990 to 2008 (http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=468&idmid=3&ItemID=12979). 
2
 Authors’ calculations. 
3
 See http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=467&idmid=3&ItemID=12889. 
4
 See http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=467&idmid=3&ItemID=12913. 
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Although how husbands and wives allocate time on unpaid housework varies across 
countries, husbands tend to do less. Ueda (2005) shows that an hour of Japanese husbands’ 
housework does not perfectly substitute for an hour of wives’ housework. Bloemen et al. 
(2010) find that Italian husbands do less housework. Hersch and Stratton (1994) find that 
wives employed full time spend more time on both housework and paid work than their 
husbands do because women earn less. Hersch and Stratton (1994) find that if the gender 
wage gap declines, time spent on housework will be closer to equal. Folbre and Nelson (2000) 
find that if wives spend more time on paid work, husbands are less likely to increase time 
spent on unpaid housework to compensate. However, they did not consider the appearance of 
home appliances. 
The explanations for the reallocation of time between husbands and wives vary and 
are not simple. Stratton (2012) indicates that men dislike housework. Thus, wives have to 
compensate. Kroska (2003) reports that women find baby care and laundry-related activities 
to be “good, potent, and active” and preparation of meals to be “particularly powerful,” but 
dislike washing dishes more than men do. Poortman and Lippe (2009) show that women tend 
to favor cleaning, cooking, and childcare more than men do. Beblo and Robledo (2008) show 
that husbands have more leisure time because they are Stackelberg leaders in sequential 
private provision games. Analyzing French workweek reduction policy, Goux et al. (2014) 
find that husbands of policy-eligible woman tend to reduce their paid work time, while the 
wives show little response if their husband was in the target group of the policy. 
In this study, we first investigate the time allocation between husbands and wives on 
unpaid housework and paid work using seemingly unrelated regressions. In the main analysis, 
we use household fixed-effect models to estimate the time gap on unpaid housework and then 
the interaction terms between the appearance of home appliances and gender. We find the 
gender gap of time is persistent and around 40.3–58.6 minutes per day, even among dual-
nonworking couples. We also find a positive nexus between the appearance of home 
appliances (gas cooker) and an increase in the time gap indicating less time on unpaid 
housework for men. We argue that the participation of the husband in specific unpaid 
housework tasks could be one of the main reasons for this nexus. 
Our study extends the previous studies in several ways. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first empirical study analyzing the interaction between home appliances and the 
gender gap of time spent on unpaid housework. By eliminating the time-invariant factors in 
household fixed-effect models, we can measure the real “natural” gender gap between 
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husbands and wives. Furthermore, we first consider the interaction terms for more than 26 
types of household composition. 
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data. Section 3 
illustrates how we estimate the gender gap of time spent on housework using different 
samples. In Section 4 we present the results, and Section 5 presents the conclusions and 
discussion. 
2 Data 
We use the Vietnamese Household Living Standard Survey 2008 (VHLSS 2008). This 
provides cross-sectional and country-representative data from the General Statistics Office of 
Vietnam (GSO) using a two-stage stratified sampling method. The VHLSS 2008 design is 
identical to the Living Standards Measurement Studies by the World Bank. VHLSS 2008 is 
the latest survey containing information about housework from 45,945 households comprising 
289,948 individuals. In the VHLSS, there are two questions: one about whether individuals 
do housework and if the answer is yes, the other concerns how many hours per day the 
individuals spent on housework on average during the previous 12 months. VHLSS 2008 
defines housework as activities such as cleaning, shopping, cooking, washing clothes, 
fetching water and wood, and repairing tools. We refer to this definition as routine unpaid 
housework. The survey includes information about the availability of home appliances such 
as freezers, vacuum cleaners, washing machines and driers, gas cookers, rice cookers, and 
microwave ovens. 
We use information on time spent on unpaid housework and the presence of home 
appliances as the main variables. We consider the head and the head’s spouse as the husband 
and wife of the family in our analysis. After excluding households in which the head does not 
have a spouse, we have 36,480 households. The descriptive statistics of our data are presented 
in Tables 1 and 2. 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
3 Empirical methods 
We estimate two econometric models. The first are seemingly unrelated regressions (SURs) 
for the decisions of husbands and wives on time spent on paid work and unpaid housework. 
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The second are household fixed-effect models (HHFEs) for analyzing the gender gap on time 
spent on unpaid housework. 
We assume that both husband 𝑗  and wife 𝑖  in a household 𝑘  allocate their time 
simultaneously between paid work and unpaid housework in four reduced-form SURs as 
follows. 
 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑘 =  𝛼1𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑗𝑘 + 𝛼2𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑗𝑘 + 𝛼3𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑘 + 𝛼4 𝑋𝑖𝑘 + 𝛼5 𝑋𝑗𝑘 +
𝛼6 𝐷𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘,           (1) 
𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑗𝑘 =  𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽4 𝑋𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽5 𝑋𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽6 𝐷𝑘 + 𝜖𝑗𝑘 , (2) 
𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑘 = 𝛾1𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑗𝑘 + 𝛾2𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑗𝑘 +  𝛾3𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑘 + 𝛾4𝑋𝑖𝑘 + 𝛾5𝑋𝑗𝑘 +
𝛾6𝐷𝑘 + 𝜂𝑖𝑘,           (3) 
𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑗𝑘 = 𝜔1𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑘 + 𝜔2𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑘 +  𝜔3𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑗𝑘 + 𝜔4𝑋𝑖𝑘 + 𝜔5𝑋𝑗𝑘 +
𝜔6𝐷𝑘 + 𝜃𝑗𝑘.           (4) 
Each individual is required to consider his/her time spent on paid work and unpaid 
housework as well as that by their partner. The decision must be based on an individual’s 
characteristics (𝑋𝑖𝑘), their partner’s characteristics (𝑋𝑗𝑘) and those of the household (𝐷𝑘). Thus, 
𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑘, 𝜖𝑗𝑘, 𝜂𝑖𝑘 , 𝜃𝑗𝑘  |𝑋) = 𝜎𝑘 with a zero mean across households. Where the couples are not 
working, the SURs become two equations, (3) and (4). 
We use HHFEs to analyze the gender gap in time spent on unpaid housework. For 
each household, we assume the time spent on unpaid housework depends mainly on (a) the 
variation that covariates with the gender of the individuals, (b) individuals’ characteristics that 
vary between the husband and the wife (𝑋𝑖𝑘), and (c) the preference or sharing rules or any 
factors that remain constant over time within the household (𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑘). 
𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑘 =  𝜑1𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑘 + 𝜑2𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑘 + 𝜑3𝑋𝑖𝑘 + 𝜑4𝑋𝑖𝑘 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑘 + 𝜑5𝐷𝑘 ∗
𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑘 + 𝜑6𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑘 + 𝜗𝑖𝑘          (5) 
The time-invariant factors are captured by a dummy for each family. We use the Stata 
command areg in our analysis with 34,679 dummies (𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑘). Thus, the coefficient 𝜑1 
shows the “pure” gender gap in time spent on unpaid housework. Meanwhile, the interactions 
between the variables of interest with 𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑘  show the marginal gap of time spent on housework 
between wife and husband if the variables of interest change by one unit, holding all other 
factors constant within the household. 
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The main characteristics of individuals are described in Tables 1 and 2. Later labeled 
Absence–w/h (Ill day–w/h), “absence” (“ill day”) indicates the total number of days in the 12 
months prior to the survey that the wife/husband was absent (ill) and unable to do routine 
work. We construct four dummies for the number of coresiding children by age cohort from 
0–6, 7–12, 13–17, and for couples coresiding without any children. 
We also add dummies for the appearance of home appliances in the household as well 
as construct the first principal component of the six appliances. We notice that pure dual-
wage earners are people who work for a salary, but who are not involved in any agricultural 
work for a family business. This is done to distinguish them from dual-wage earners who 
might do both of these types of work. 
We divide the data into six main categories as a robustness check of the gender gap, 
and of the interaction between the variables of interest and gender. These categories are as 
follows. Working status (both not working, dual-working couples
5
, dual-wage earner, and 
pure dual-wage earner); number of coresiding children (0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and > 4); husband’s age 
(< 26, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, and > 65); quartiles of income (4th quartile is the 
richest)
6
; household size (< 4, 4, 5, and > 5); and dual-chore undertaken couples
7
. This is to 
separate the influence of these categories on the variables of interest and to provide an insight 
into any differences, if they exist. These categories help us to check the robustness of the 
results relative to the reduced forms equations of (5). 
In addition, we apply three measures to deal with the high correlations between gas 
cookers and rice cookers
8
/washing machines
9
/freezers (0.52, 0.37, and 0.43, respectively). 
First, we conduct principal component analysis by constructing the first principal component 
(𝑃𝐶𝐴) from six interaction terms between gender and home appliance variables. Second, we 
retain gas cookers, vacuum cleaners, and microwave ovens in the analyses. Finally, we 
estimate separately each of the variables of interest for each of the data samples. We test their 
signs and statistical significance across the various data samples. We report the analyses with 
𝑃𝐶𝐴 and three appliances as the main results, and present the other results in the Appendix. 
                                                 
5
 Dual-working couples are those who both do some work for income. Dual-wage earners are those that both do 
some jobs for wages. 
6
 This is because the rich have more tools (Cowan 1983). 
7
 Couples that spent at least one minute on unpaid housework. 
8
 Unfortunately, the GSO uses the same code for rice cookers, electronic cookers, and pressure cookers. 
Therefore, we refer to this variable as “rice cookers” and use the coded variable to construct PCA for the six 
variables. 
9
 The variable “washing machine” represents both washing machines and driers. 
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4 Results 
As shown in Table 4, the gender gap of time spent on unpaid housework is persistent and 
approximately 40.3 to 58.6 minutes per day. The gap is 18.24 minutes lower if both the 
husband and wife do unpaid housework for at least a minute each day. When comparing the 
gap across the data samples in Table 5, the gaps are statistically significant in 26 samples 
regardless of the working status, number of coresiding children, birth cohorts, income levels, 
and household sizes. This is consistent with the results of Vu (2014) who finds a daily 5.25-
minute gender gap between Vietnamese siblings aged less than 18 years on daily unpaid 
housework. 
[Insert Tables 3, 4, and 5 here] 
We find a substitution between paid work and unpaid housework in Table 3. The rate 
is different between men and women: 55 (43) minutes of paid work for one hour of unpaid 
housework for women (men). However, without any paid work, as seen in column (4) of 
Table 4, the gap is still 52 minutes each day. 
Home appliances are associated with different amounts of time spent on housework 
between husbands and wives. For example, in Table 3, gas cookers help to reduce the time 
spent on unpaid housework for the husbands by much as 1.8 minutes per day. However, gas 
cookers increase the amount of unpaid housework of wives by 3.8 minutes per day. 
The time gap between wives and husbands increases in association with the 
appearance of home appliances. As shown in column (1) of Table 4, the first principal 
component of the six home appliances increases the gap by 4.7 minutes per day for wives. We 
find the estimated 𝑃𝐶𝐴 is statistically insignificant among pure dual-wage earners, couples 
with more than four children, husbands aged less than 26, and those in the lowest income 
quartile as shown in Table 5. 
Examining the effects of specific appliances, we find the interaction term constructed 
from gas cookers and gender has the most statistically significant coefficient of 16.9 minutes 
per day as shown in column (2) of Table 4. The significance of the coefficients is independent 
of model specifications that include or exclude other home appliances as shown in the 
corresponding coefficients in both Table 5 and the Appendix. However, the coefficients 
become statistically insignificant for pure dual-wage earners where the husband is aged less 
than 26 years. Among the couples living with more than four children or in the lowest income 
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quartile, the statistically insignificant 𝑃𝐶𝐴  could be due to the opposite signs of the 
interaction terms. 
The decision to participate in unpaid housework is one of the main reasons for women 
spending more time on housework following the appearance of gas cookers. We find that with 
a gas cooker, husbands are 6% less likely to do unpaid housework, while the wife is only 
0.6% less likely as shown in Table 6. This might be because men believe that the cooking 
with a gas cooker is not difficult enough to warrant their help. Without a gas cooker, men may 
become involved in tasks such as collecting and chopping firewood. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
We hypothesize some additional reasons for the increased gender gap in time 
associated with the appearance of home appliances, particularly gas cookers. First, it could be 
that men do less housework while women do more, as shown in columns (7) and (8) of Table 
3. Second, although gas cookers reduce cooking time because of convenient heat adjustment 
and multiple-task heating, they allow women to cook more dishes per meal. Thus, the total 
time spent using gas cookers and cleaning dishes (we assume that women are more likely to 
do such cleaning) increases. Third, gas cookers might be more closely related to wives’ tasks, 
whereas other home appliances could be gender-neutral. Washing machines, microwave 
ovens, and vacuum cleaners do not require a specific strength or skill related to 
feminine/masculine characteristics. Fourth, wives could be more involved because they 
consider cooking time as leisure time. Indirect evidence is that women who are pure dual-
wage earners are more likely to participate (a 1.25% increase) if the household owns a gas 
cooker (see Table 6). 
Meanwhile, among pure dual-wage earners, we would argue that the time adjustment 
of the couples when all income comes from paid work would be rigid. Thus, time constraints 
give women no opportunity to increase time spent on unpaid housework even if it is 
considered a leisure activity. Furthermore, by having stable income, women can have more 
bargaining power. Thus, men cannot avoid collaborating with women and sharing tasks 
related to gas cookers. These arguments could explain why the time gap in the two groups is 
the same, and why women are more likely to do housework where a gas cooker is available. 
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5 Conclusions and discussion 
We examined the time spent on unpaid housework by 36,480 Vietnamese couples. The 
gender gap is persistent across generations despite changes in the Vietnamese economy. 
Despite differences in household composition in terms of age, size, income, number of 
coresiding children, and working status, we found that husbands spend 40.3–58.6 fewer 
minutes each day on unpaid housework than their wives do. One of the important reasons is 
that men are less likely to do housework. Working status can explain the substitution between 
paid work and unpaid housework. However, among dual-nonworking couples, the gender gap 
of time was still 52 minutes. We also found that some home appliances (such as microwave 
ovens and gas cookers) reduce the time spent on housework by husbands. Nevertheless, the 
gender gap of time increases with the appearance of home appliances such as gas cookers. We 
found that a reduction in the probability of men participating in housework tasks related to 
gas cookers is one of the main reasons for the larger gap. In addition, a woman may do more 
housework as a leisure activity and because a gas cooker enables her to cook more dishes and 
do other related tasks (such as cleaning). However, this effect does not exist among pure dual-
wage earners or in cases where husbands are aged less than 26 years. 
We acknowledge several limitations of our data and analyses. First, the time spent on 
housework is retrospective, but not in a form of time use survey where each specific task of 
each individual is recorded with both the starting and the ending time. Second, we bypassed 
the self-selection of men and women toward specific tasks, the productivity of doing 
housework and the collaboration between couples on the same task. Thus, the gender gap 
might be associated with the specific tasks included in the survey. Third, we were only able to 
consider gas cookers, but not other types of cookers such as electronic cookers, pressure 
cookers, and rice cookers. This is because the survey coded the three mentioned cookers in 
the same variable. 
The positive relationship between gender gap of time and the appearance of home 
appliances has several policy implications. First, the gap exists because individuals might be 
self-selected to certain specific tasks of unpaid housework. Thus, policies to increase the 
participation of women in paid work should consider this effect. Second, the positive 
interaction terms indicate that the policies facilitating the participation of men in housework 
also empower women. This can also influence the marketing strategies of the suppliers of 
home appliances. Similarly, policies aimed at empowering women via microcredit should 
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consider this interaction. Finally, our study confirms the existence of gender roles in terms of 
unpaid housework between husbands and wives. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of husbands and wives in the selected sample 
 Wife    Husband    
Variables Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
UHW (daily hours of unpaid housework) 2.354 1.238 0 8 1.149 0.994 0 8 
PW (daily hours of paid work) 3.815 2.619 0 17.753 4.013 2.508 0 16.767 
UHW (daily hours of unpaid housework > 0, N = 25,924) 2.380 1.096 1 8 1.560 0.808 1 8 
PW (daily hours of paid work > 0, N = 30,253) 4.364 2.310 0.011 16.767 4.428 2.200 0.016 16.767 
Work for income (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.874 0.332 0 1 0.901 0.299 0 1 
Dual-wage earners 0.646 0.478 0 1 0.498 0.500 0 1 
Pure dual-wage earners 0.102 0.303 0 1 0.159 0.366 0 1 
Age 45.553 11.916 18 92 48.459 12.359 18 98 
Years of schooling 6.953 4.081 0 20 7.986 4.046 0 19 
Absence (Absent days from routine tasks in previous 12 months) 5.673 19.419 0 365 5.680 22.377 0 365 
Ill days (Number of days in illness in previous 12 months) 1.741 11.399 0 365 2.229 16.726 0 365 
Total number of households = 36,480 
 13 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of households in the selected sample 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
0 children
a
 0.106 0.307 0 1 
1 child  0.211 0.408 0 1 
2 children  0.408 0.491 0 1 
3 children  0.177 0.382 0 1 
4 children  0.064 0.244 0 1 
More than 4 children  0.099 0.299 0 1 
Number of children aged < 7 0.400 0.662 0 8 
Number of children aged 7–12 0.446 0.675 0 5 
Number of children aged 13–17 0.538 0.719 0 5 
Number of other adults (age > 18 & excluding the head and the 
head’s spouse) 3.041 1.190 2 10 
House living area in square meters 69.470 40.386 5 1,056 
Tap water (being used) 0.215 0.411 0 1 
Freezer 0.311 0.463 0 1 
Washing machine 0.119 0.323 0 1 
Gas cooker 0.446 0.497 0 1 
Rice cooker 0.693 0.461 0 1 
Vacuum cleaner 0.012 0.109 0 1 
Microwave oven 0.024 0.152 0 1 
Urban 0.245 0.430 0 1 
a
Children are those of the head and are coresiding in the household. Total number of households = 36,480
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Table 3 Seemingly unrelated regressions with four decisions on time spent on paid work and 
unpaid housework 
 1
st
 PC of 6 appliances Three appliances 
Variables PW–w PW–h UHW–w UHW–h PW–w PW–h UHW–w UHW–h 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PW–w 
 
0.601*** –0.263*** 0.144*** 
 
0.601*** –0.263*** 0.144*** 
  
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
PW–h 0.681*** 
 
0.191*** –0.158*** 0.681*** 
 
0.190*** –0.158*** 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
UHW–w –0.913*** 0.636***   0.246*** –0.913*** 0.636*** 
 
0.246*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009)   (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
(0.004) 
UHW–h 0.746*** –0.721*** 0.347*** 
 
0.746*** –0.721*** 0.347*** 
 
 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.006) 
 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.006) 
 Absence–w –0.010*** 
 
–0.005*** 0.003*** –0.010*** 
 
–0.005*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Ill day–w –0.010*** 
 
–0.007*** 0.005*** –0.010*** 
 
–0.007*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.000) 
Absence–h 
 
–0.010*** 0.002*** –0.003***   –0.010*** 0.002*** –0.003*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ill day–h 
 
–0.008*** 0.003*** –0.004*** 
 
–0.008*** 0.003*** –0.004*** 
  
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Living without a child 
  
0.023 0.088*** 
  
0.022 0.089*** 
   
(0.023) (0.020) 
  
(0.023) (0.020) 
Child
a
 aged < 7 
  
0.011 0.002 
  
0.012 0.001 
   
(0.010) (0.008) 
  
(0.010) (0.008) 
Child aged 7–12 
  
–0.029*** –0.019** 
  
–0.028*** –0.019** 
   
(0.009) (0.008) 
  
(0.009) (0.008) 
Child aged 13–17 
  
–0.070*** –0.074*** 
  
–0.069*** –0.074*** 
   
(0.009) (0.008) 
  
(0.009) (0.008) 
Number of adults 
  
–0.056*** –0.073*** 
  
–0.056*** –0.073*** 
   
(0.006) (0.005) 
  
(0.006) (0.005) 
House living area 
  
0.000*** –0.000 
  
0.000*** –0.000* 
   
(0.000) (0.000) 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
Tap water   0.041** –0.045***   0.042** –0.047*** 
   (0.018) (0.015)   (0.018) (0.015) 
PCA (6 appliances) 
  
0.015*** –0.014*** 
    
   
(0.005) (0.004) 
    Gas cooker 
      
0.063*** –0.030** 
       
(0.014) (0.012) 
Vacuum cleaner 
      
0.002 –0.031 
       
(0.055) (0.047) 
Microwave oven 
      
–0.006 –0.067* 
      
 (0.041) (0.035) 
Age and age ^2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Schooling years Yes Yes 
  
Yes Yes 
  Provinces & urban 
 
  Yes Yes 
  
Yes  Yes 
Constant 0.631*** 1.403*** 1.967*** 0.632*** 0.630*** 1.405*** 1.943*** 0.656*** 
 
(0.144) (0.148) (0.090) (0.083) (0.144) (0.148) (0.090) (0.083) 
Observations 36,480 36,480 36,480 36,480 36,480 36,480 36,480 36,480 
R–squared 0.182 0.239 0.107 0.040 0.182 0.239 0.108 0.040 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). Children are those of the head and 
are coresiding in the household
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Table 4 Household fixed-effect models on time spent on unpaid housework 
 
1
st
 PC from 6 
appliances 
Three 
appliances   
 
All Both do chores Both do not work 
Variables UHW UHW UHW UHW 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sex 0.952*** 0.976*** 0.672*** 0.863*** 
 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.127) 
PCA 0.078*** 
   
 
(0.007) 
   Gas cooker  sex 
 
0.281*** 0.197*** 0.439*** 
  
(0.025) (0.023) (0.129) 
Microwave oven  sex 
 
0.274*** 0.299*** 0.108 
  
(0.103) (0.106) (0.263) 
Vacuum cleaner  sex 
 
0.004 0.114 –0.492 
  
(0.119) (0.121) (0.375) 
Working hour –0.116*** –0.115*** –0.080*** 
 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
 Absence –0.006*** –0.006*** –0.002*** –0.006*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ill day –0.008*** –0.008*** –0.004** –0.008*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Dual-wage earners –0.345*** –0.344*** –0.288*** 
 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.029) 
 Pure dual-wage earners –0.380*** –0.382*** –0.206*** 
 
 
(0.059) (0.060) (0.061) 
 Age and age ^2 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Head of the household Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self-employed (types 1–3) Yes Yes Yes 
Working (dummy) Yes Yes Yes 
N/2–1 dummies of households Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.001*** 1.954*** 2.869*** 12.396*** 
 
(0.299) (0.299) (0.317) (3.771) 
Observations (N) 72,960 72,960 51,848 3,972 
R–squared 0.704 0.704 0.738 0.721 
Adjusted R–squared 0.408 0.408 0.469 0.439 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1)
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Table 5 Interaction terms by data sample 
Data selections 
 
N 1st PC from 6 appliances Three appliances 
      
   
Sex St. err. PCA St. err. Sex St. err. 
Gas cooker  
sex St. err. 
Microwave  
sex St. err. 
Vacuum  
sex St. err. 
All (1) 72,960 0.952*** (0.029) 0.078*** (0.007) 0.976*** (0.028) 0.281*** (0.025) 0.274*** (0.103) 0.004 (0.119) 
Dual-nonworking (2) 3,972 0.874*** (0.136) 0.101*** (0.036) 0.863*** (0.127) 0.439*** (0.129) 0.108 (0.263) –0.492 (0.375) 
Dual-working (3) 60,506 0.881*** (0.030) 0.062*** (0.007) 0.910*** (0.029) 0.204*** (0.024) 0.250** (0.120) 0.172 (0.127) 
Dual-wage earner (4) 12,120 1.001*** (0.060) 0.043*** (0.016) 1.013*** (0.057) 0.145*** (0.054) 0.010 (0.234) 0.347 (0.241) 
Pure dual-wage earner (5) 4,642 1.149*** (0.112) 0.026 (0.031) 1.179*** (0.105) 0.051 (0.105) –0.150 (0.251) 0.498* (0.276) 
Living without a child (6) 7,708 0.803*** (0.077) 0.060*** (0.021) 0.848*** (0.076) 0.143* (0.074) 0.526* (0.302) –0.089 (0.245) 
1 childa (7) 15,366 0.978*** (0.061) 0.066*** (0.017) 0.992*** (0.056) 0.236*** (0.054) 0.274 (0.233) 0.042 (0.269) 
2 children (8) 29,734 0.918*** (0.044) 0.083*** (0.011) 0.939*** (0.042) 0.306*** (0.037) 0.195 (0.143) 0.086 (0.178) 
3 children (9) 12,916 1.025*** (0.088) 0.096*** (0.017) 1.079*** (0.090) 0.324*** (0.064) 0.448* (0.240) –0.096 (0.264) 
4 children (10) 4,664 1.094*** (0.129) 0.066** (0.030) 1.105*** (0.123) 0.251** (0.102) 0.501 (0.607) –0.366 (0.679) 
> 4 children (11) 2,572 1.210*** (0.167) 0.033 (0.039) 1.140*** (0.162) 0.363** (0.163) –1.069 (0.680) –0.229 (1.230) 
Husband aged < 26 (12) 576 1.033*** (0.368) 0.081 (0.065) 1.120*** (0.377) 0.143 (0.365) 
    Husband aged 26–35 (13) 9,308 0.949*** (0.087) 0.040** (0.018) 0.910*** (0.084) 0.273*** (0.069) –0.266 (0.341) 0.191 (0.362) 
Husband aged 36–45 (14) 23,292 0.990*** (0.054) 0.062*** (0.013) 1.010*** (0.053) 0.236*** (0.042) 0.109 (0.263) 0.126 (0.249) 
Husband aged 46–55 (15) 21,686 0.952*** (0.049) 0.090*** (0.012) 0.994*** (0.047) 0.287*** (0.044) 0.291** (0.144) 0.156 (0.170) 
Husband aged 56–65 (16) 10,192 0.853*** (0.077) 0.105*** (0.020) 0.918*** (0.071) 0.314*** (0.066) 0.410* (0.238) –0.350 (0.283) 
Husband aged > 65 (17) 7,906 0.799*** (0.095) 0.072*** (0.022) 0.805*** (0.093) 0.272*** (0.082) 0.437* (0.254) –0.017 (0.408) 
1st quartile income (18) 18,236 0.855*** (0.064) 0.017 (0.014) 0.849*** (0.063) 0.194*** (0.073) –0.855 (1.149) 0.237 (0.436) 
2nd quartile income (19) 18,238 0.967*** (0.055) 0.033** (0.014) 0.949*** (0.052) 0.224*** (0.047) 0.118 (0.425) –0.266 (0.378) 
3rd quartile income (20) 18,252 1.056*** (0.062) 0.055*** (0.016) 1.081*** (0.057) 0.169*** (0.048) 0.511* (0.265) –0.096 (0.307) 
4th quartile income (21) 18,234 0.970*** (0.071) 0.096*** (0.019) 1.041*** (0.069) 0.249*** (0.065) 0.198* (0.115) –0.010 (0.141) 
Household size < 4 (22) 18,408 0.917*** (0.054) 0.054*** (0.015) 0.927*** (0.050) 0.197*** (0.049) 0.224 (0.222) –0.030 (0.228) 
Household size = 4 (23) 24,990 0.930*** (0.048) 0.086*** (0.011) 0.971*** (0.046) 0.267*** (0.041) 0.351** (0.150) 0.165 (0.196) 
Household size = 5 (24) 15,138 0.969*** (0.069) 0.090*** (0.015) 1.004*** (0.071) 0.333*** (0.055) 0.328 (0.241) –0.048 (0.257) 
Household size > 5 (25) 14,424 1.048*** (0.078) 0.072*** (0.016) 1.047*** (0.074) 0.343*** (0.060) 0.161 (0.244) –0.209 (0.303) 
Dual chore undertaken (26) 51,848 0.630*** (0.027) 0.067*** (0.007) 0.672*** (0.026) 0.197*** (0.023) 0.299*** (0.106) 0.114 (0.121) 
Children are those of the head and coresiding in the household
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Table 6 Mean comparison tests between two samples, with and without gas cooker 
Data selections Gas cooker available (A) Without gas cooker (B) Difference 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean (A)–(B) 
All      
 Participation–Ha 16,279 0.6958 20,201 0.7563 –0.0605*** 
 Participation–W 16,279 0.9599 20,201 0.9659 –0.0060*** 
 Time gap–ab 16,279 1.3831 20,201 1.0622 0.3209*** 
 Time gap–b 10,984 0.9306 14,940 0.7382 0.1924*** 
Pure dual-wage owners      
 Participation–H 1,753 0.7467 568 0.6919 0.0548 
 Participation–W 1,753 0.9738 568 0.9613 0.0125** 
 Time gap–a 1,753 1.2801 568 1.2324 0.0477 
 Time gap–b 1,286 0.9393 384 0.8646 0.0747 
Age husband < 26      
 Participation–H 62 0.8065 226 0.8717 –0.0652 
 Participation–W 62 0.9839 226 0.9956 0.0117 
 Time gap–a 62 1.4839 226 0.9558 0.5281*** 
 Time gap–b 50 1.100 196 0.6990 0.4010** 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
a
Participation–H (W) is percentage of husbands (wives) who spent at least one minute on unpaid housework 
b
Time gap–a (b) is the time difference between a wife and husband using the sample of all (dual chore 
undertaken) couples
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Appendix Robustness checks by separating each home appliance per estimation and by data sample 
Data selections  N Interaction between sex and 
   
Gas cooker Std. err. 
Microwave 
oven Std. err. 
Vacuum 
cleaner Std. err. Freezer Std. err. 
Washing 
machine Std. err. 
Rice 
cooker Std. err. 
All (1) 72,960 0.295*** (0.025) 0.399*** (0.097) 0.224** (0.113) 0.244*** (0.028) 0.326*** (0.044) 0.138*** (0.025) 
Dual-nonworking (2) 3,972 0.434*** (0.127) 0.142 (0.249) –0.348 (0.353) 0.358*** (0.127) 0.328** (0.152) 0.289* (0.151) 
Dual-working (3) 60,506 0.218*** (0.024) 0.383*** (0.113) 0.349*** (0.121) 0.181*** (0.027) 0.291*** (0.046) 0.107*** (0.024) 
Dual-wage earner (4) 12,120 0.158*** (0.054) 0.169 (0.205) 0.408** (0.201) 0.149** (0.062) 0.161* (0.084) 0.063 (0.056) 
Pure dual-wage earner (5) 4,642 0.058 (0.104) 0.001 (0.222) 0.421* (0.230) 0.091 (0.099) 0.024 (0.106) 0.051 (0.123) 
Living without a child (6) 7,708 0.165** (0.073) 0.579** (0.286) 0.125 (0.240) 0.203** (0.084) 0.357** (0.175) –0.003 (0.077) 
1 childa (7) 15,366 0.254*** (0.054) 0.383* (0.219) 0.242 (0.259) 0.197*** (0.060) 0.263*** (0.094) 0.094* (0.056) 
2 children (8) 29,734 0.318*** (0.037) 0.335** (0.135) 0.273 (0.170) 0.237*** (0.040) 0.306*** (0.057) 0.158*** (0.039) 
3 children (9) 12,916 0.341*** (0.064) 0.567** (0.223) 0.213 (0.234) 0.358*** (0.072) 0.431*** (0.121) 0.173*** (0.061) 
4 children (10) 4,664 0.264** (0.103) 0.539 (0.545) 0.039 (0.541) 0.100 (0.130) 0.442* (0.245) 0.192** (0.093) 
More than 4 children (11) 2,572 0.326** (0.162) –0.933 (0.580) –1.073 (1.107) 0.221 (0.188) –0.027 (0.362) 0.376*** (0.133) 
Husband age < 26 (12) 576 0.143 (0.365) 
    
0.474 (0.441) 0.482 (0.833) 0.411 (0.260) 
Husband age 26–35 (13) 9,308 0.268*** (0.068) –0.065 (0.356) 0.220 (0.369) 0.155* (0.083) 0.044 (0.126) 0.153** (0.065) 
Husband age 36–45 (14) 23,292 0.243*** (0.042) 0.241 (0.233) 0.256 (0.212) 0.199*** (0.048) 0.227*** (0.078) 0.156*** (0.042) 
Husband age 46–55 (15) 21,686 0.308*** (0.044) 0.445*** (0.135) 0.377** (0.160) 0.237*** (0.047) 0.385*** (0.073) 0.135*** (0.047) 
Husband age 56–65 (16) 10,192 0.333*** (0.065) 0.477** (0.228) –0.075 (0.267) 0.349*** (0.073) 0.544*** (0.108) 0.116* (0.070) 
Husband age > 65 (17) 7,906 0.302*** (0.081) 0.556** (0.250) 0.274 (0.410) 0.252*** (0.091) 0.252* (0.146) 0.056 (0.083) 
1st quartile income (18) 18,236 0.190*** (0.073) –0.711 (1.147) 0.217 (0.400) 0.023 (0.112) –0.166 (0.278) 0.051 (0.043) 
2nd quartile income (19) 18,238 0.224*** (0.047) 0.182 (0.418) –0.227 (0.389) 0.008 (0.062) 0.061 (0.190) 0.024 (0.045) 
3rd quartile income (20) 18,252 0.174*** (0.048) 0.556** (0.270) 0.008 (0.300) 0.091* (0.051) 0.203** (0.089) 0.040 (0.061) 
4th quartile income (21) 18,234 0.267*** (0.064) 0.233** (0.107) 0.112 (0.132) 0.269*** (0.055) 0.224*** (0.058) 0.050 (0.084) 
Household size <4 (22) 18,408 0.208*** (0.049) 0.304 (0.209) 0.124 (0.216) 0.183*** (0.056) 0.240** (0.096) 0.033 (0.050) 
Household size = 4 (23) 24,990 0.288*** (0.040) 0.494*** (0.141) 0.393** (0.188) 0.242*** (0.044) 0.323*** (0.063) 0.154*** (0.044) 
Household size = 5 (24) 15,138 0.345*** (0.054) 0.457** (0.228) 0.206 (0.246) 0.291*** (0.060) 0.391*** (0.099) 0.167*** (0.052) 
Household size > 5 (25) 14,424 0.347*** (0.060) 0.272 (0.224) 0.034 (0.275) 0.251*** (0.068) 0.340*** (0.112) 0.205*** (0.056) 
Dual chore undertaken (26) 51,848 0.214*** (0.023) 0.413*** (0.100) 0.306*** (0.116) 0.205*** (0.027) 0.299*** (0.044) 0.142*** (0.022) 
aChildren are those of the head and are coresiding in the household 
